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INTRODUCTION
A. Background
In Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights found, inter alia, that the United States
violated a woman's right to equality and non-discrimination under Article
II of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.' The
Commission found that the existing legal framework in the United States
does not meet international human rights standards,2 particularly with
regard to women from minority and low-income groups.3 It stressed that
international law requires states to act with "due diligence" to protect
women from domestic violence.4 Moreover, the Commission recognized
that because domestic violence is one of the most pervasive and pernicious
forms of gender-based violence, states should adopt special measures to
protect at-risk groups, including young women.5 It urged the United States
to enact laws to make the enforcement of protective orders mandatory and
"to create effective implementation mechanisms . . . accompanied by
adequate resources destined to foster their implementation" and "training
programs" for law enforcement and judicial officials. 6
1. See Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, 5 (2011).
2. See id 160 (acknowledging that the United States recognized its duty to
protect its citizens from domestic violence and failed to do so).
3. See id 94 ("Studies and investigations presented by the parties reveal that
women constitute the majority of domestic violence victims in the United States. Some
sectors of the United States female population are at a particular risk [of] domestic
violence acts, such as Native American women and those pertaining to low-income
groups.").
4. See id. 123 ("[T]here is a broad international consensus over the use of the
due diligence principle to interpret the content of State legal obligations towards the
problem of violence against women; a consensus that extends to the problem of
domestic violence. This consensus is a reflection of the international community's
growing recognition of violence against women as a human rights problem requiring
State action.").
5. See id. 201(4)-(5) (insisting that the United States execute measures at federal
and state levels including training programs for law enforcement designed to respond to
domestic violent situations that threaten harm to women and children).
6. See id. 201(4) (claiming that such training programs will protect women from
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The Indian Government, unlike its American counterpart, has enacted
legislation to provide women with a range of remedies and protections
from domestic violence. In 1983, India's Parliament added Section 498A
to the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which allows women to file criminal
complaints against their husbands and husbands' relatives for any "cruelty"
suffered at their hands.7 In 2005, the Parliament passed the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA), a wide-ranging law that
protects women from various types of violence (physical, sexual, verbal,
and economic) and imposes positive obligations on the state to protect
women from violence.8 For instance, the state is required to provide police
officers with "periodic sensitization and awareness training" on domestic
violence issues.9 The Act also empowers the state to pass protective orders
(that the police must enforce) and to appoint special "protection officers"
assigned to assist domestic violence victims in obtaining medical care and
in the filing of domestic violence reports.' 0
Thus, India already has laws in place that, at least in theory, meet the
Inter-American Commission's recommendations in Lenahan. India
therefore presents an interesting case study to analyze whether human
rights recommendations aimed at a particular country-here, the United
States-can be generalized and implemented effectively in a different
environment. This Article will analyze the deficiencies in the Indian
domestic violence regime in light of the Lenahan recommendations.
While the Indian government should be applauded for taking seriously
its obligations to protect women from domestic violence, this paper shows
that its positive approach has been stymied by: (1) the victimization of
male partners and their female relatives as a result of special protections
accorded to women; and (2) police harassment and rent-seeking under the
guise of enforcement. These negative consequences have overshadowed
the benefits that these laws were intended to provide to domestic violence
victims. This demonstrates that even a legislative framework against
domestic violence that meets international human rights standards can be
limited or counterproductive due to powerful cultural and institutional
barriers.
imminent violence).
7. See The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, No. 46 of 1983, INDIA PEN.
CODE § 498A (1860) (protecting women from both physical and mental actions that
may drive them to suicide or likely injury to life, limb, or health).
8. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005,
INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (providing more effective protection of the rights of
women who are victims of violence).
9. See id § 11(b) (noting that training also applies to central and state government
officials).
10. See id. §§ 8-9 (describing that the duties of protection officers include locating
a safe shelter home and maintaining a list of legal service providers).
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The Article proceeds in six parts. Section I traces the history of
domestic violence in India from independence up to the passage of the
PWDVA. Sections II and III lay out the major criticisms of the PWDVA
and Section 498A, respectively, paying particular attention to the
victimization of male partners and female in-laws, as well as police
corruption. Section IV outlines the facts of the Lenahan case and discusses
the U.S. court decisions and the Inter-American Commission Report. It
then analyzes the differences between the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Commission's Report, focusing on sources of law and the breadth of
inquiry undertaken by each body. Section V discusses the Indian domestic
violence legislation within the framework of the Lenahan Report, which
advanced a broad conception of equality.
The Article concludes with some recommendations as to how India can
reform its domestic violence regime such that it continues to positively
protect women, but mitigates the negative consequences stemming from its
current laws. In short, India must adopt multifaceted legislation that better
targets deeply rooted institutional and cultural problems such as corruption
and patriarchal social norms, in addition to combating domestic violence
per se.
B. Domestic Violence in India
In Indian society, strong patriarchal norms dictate that women have little
social status in society right from birth." Sex selective abortion of female
fetuses and female infanticide are widely practiced to ensure only male
children are born.12 Indian women also have lower life expectancies and
less access to education (and therefore lower literacy rates), healthcare, and
employment opportunities than Indian men.'3 There is also a widespread
belief that a woman is her father's, and later her husband's, property. 4
This is illustrated by the traditional dowry system in which a bride's family
must provide cash, property or gifts to her bridegroom's family as part of
11. See Laurel Remers Pardee, The Dilemma ofDowry Deaths: Domestic Disgrace
or International Human Rights Catastrophe?, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491, 502(1996) (positing that the view of women as property in India has conditioned women to
expect abuse and to endure it); Pami Vyas, Note, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence
in India: Economic Abuse and the Need for Broad Statutory Interpretation to Promote
Women's Fundamental Rights, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 177, 185 (2006) (noting that
pervasive gender discrimination occurs from birth, through marriage, until a woman's
death).
12. See Vyas, supra note 11, at 184 (explaining that religious and social customs,
like dowry, contribute to such practices).
13. See id at 184-85 (stating that a woman's responsibilities as a wife, mother, and
daughter-in-law take precedence over other opportunities).
14. See Pardee, supra note 11, at 502 (showing that the dowry system rests on the
notion that men own their wives).
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the wedding.15
Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that Indian women suffer from a
high incidence of domestic violence. Indian government statistics indicate
that, on average, a crime is committed against women every three minutes
and that thirty-seven percent of married women experience domestic
violence at some point in their marriage.16 More disturbingly, eighty-seven
percent of the men surveyed in a 2001 study admitted to committing some
domestic violence act in that year.' 7
Both Section 498A and the PWDVA have been criticized for
encouraging false complaints that have led to the victimization of the most
frequent perpetrators of domestic violence-the male partner and his
female relatives. The PWDVA defines domestic violence broadly, and
includes "insults" and "ridicule" under the definition of "verbal and
emotional abuse," without defining those terms.'8 Opponents of the law
claim that such capacious definitions invite women to report mere domestic
squabbles as domestic violence under the PWDVA.19 These opponents
have also gained traction by arguing that these laws violate a man's right to
equality, citing the fact that only women (not men) can file claims under
the PWDVA and Section 498A.20  The upshot of this conservative
advocacy is that accused men and their female relatives have been recast as
a vulnerable group victimized by domestic violence laws. However, there
is no evidence to substantiate these claims of victimization, which have
15. See Amy Hornbeck et al., The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act: Solution or Mere Paper Tiger?, 4 Lov. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 273, 275 (2007)
(detailing the importance of dowry as a tool for social mobility, especially because a
woman becomes part of her husband's family rather than her natal family upon
marriage).
16. See National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India-2005 (Aug. 4, 2006),
available at http://ncrb.nic.in/ciiprevious/Data/CD-C112005/cii-2005/Crime%20Clock-
05.pdf (delineating the incidence of different domestic violence crimes against women
in India); INT'L INST. FOR POPULATION Scis. & MACRO INT'L, NATIONAL FAMILY
HEALTH SURVEY (NFHS-3), 2005-2006: INDIA: VOLUME I 509 (2007), available at
http://hetv.org/india/nfhs/nfhs3/NFHS-3-Chapter- 1 5-Domestic-Violence.pdf
(classifying the statistics on domestic abuse under female empowerment).
17. See INT'L CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIA:
EXPLORING STRATEGIES, PROMOTING DIALOGUE 12 (2002), available at
http://www.icrw.org/files/publications/Domestic-Violence-in-India-4-Men-Masculinity
-and-Domestic-Violence-in-India.pdf (noting also the types of violence used against
women).
18. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, §
3, Explanation I(iii), INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (adding that the insults especially
apply to those that deal with not having a child or a male child).
19. See Biswajit Ghosh & Tanima Choudhuri, Legal Protection Against Domestic
Violence in India: Scope and Limitations, 26 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 319, 323 (2011).
20. See, e.g., FIGHT AGAINST MISUSE OF DOWRY LAW (IPC-498A),
http://www.498a.org (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (contending that 498A is rampantly
misused by "unscrupulous" women to extort and harass men).
3372012]
5
Abeyratne and Jain: Domestic Violence Legislation in India: The Pitfalls of a Human R
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 21:2
mostly arisen from hearsay and rumor and are probably exaggerated.21 It is
nonetheless ironic that the PWDVA-which aims to protect women from
domestic violence-has become notorious in Indian society as a tool to
victimize other women, particularly the mothers-in-law and sisters-in-law
of female complainants.
At an institutional level, rampant police corruption has led to weak
enforcement of domestic violence laws, as cases against wealthy or
influential suspects are not properly investigated and recorded, and other
suspects escape prosecution or civil penalties through bribes. 22 The Indian
police also exploit domestic violence laws to extort money from innocent
men. For example, because Section 498A sets forth a presumption of guilt,
the police have reportedly threatened to arrest many men and their relatives
unless they pay substantial bribes.23 The Indian Supreme Court has noted
that this provision gives "a licen[s]e to unscrupulous persons to wreck
personal vendetta or unleash harassment" that could create a new legal
terrorism.24
Thus, the PWDVA and Section 498A have been rendered ineffective,
even counterproductive, due to deeply rooted cultural norms and
institutional deficiencies. These adverse effects have prevented Indian
domestic violence law from providing the sort of protection to women that
the Indian government anticipated.
I. HISTORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION IN INDIA
A. Anti-dowry and Criminal Provisions
India became independent in 1947 and adopted a Constitution in 1950,
which remains in force today.25 Part III of the Constitution protects
fundamental rights, including the right to life, which has been interpreted to
mean the right to live a life with dignity and free from violence.26 The
21. See infra Section III(B) (discussing Indian domestic violence legislation in the
context of the Lenahan decision).
22. See Ghosh & Choudhuri, supra note 19, at 327 (positing that rather than the
police acting as saviors of domestic abuse victims pursuant to its new role under the
PWDVA, it has instead embraced the power to punish clashes).
23. See Madhu Purnima Kishwar, Laws Against Domestic Violence: Underused or
Abused?, MANUSHI, Sept.-Oct. 2000 [hereinafter Kishwar, Laws Against Domestic
Violence], available at http://www.indiatogether.org/manushi/issuel20/domestic.htm
(adding that cruelty in a marriage under 498A constitutes a non-bailable offense).
24. See Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (2005) 1 S.C.R. 730, 18 (India)
(emphasis omitted) (decrying the misuse of 498A as "an assassin's weapon" rather than
as a shield designed to strike at the roots of the "dowry menace").
25. See INDIA CONST. art. 394, available at http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-
english/coi-indexenglish.htm (noting January 26, 1950, as the commencement of
India's Constitution).
26. See id. art. 21. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which protects the right to
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Constitution also empowers the State to take affirmative measures to
protect women under Article 15 .27 The Indian Parliament has often
invoked Article 15 to pass special legislative or executive measures to
protect women, which have generally been upheld by the Courts.2 8
It took India fourteen years after independence to pass its first law
directly relating to violence against women. In 1961, the Dowry
Prohibition Act (DPA) came into effect and criminalized the acts of giving
and taking dowry. However, the Act did not effectively curb the practice
of dowry. 29 The Indian Parliament later passed the Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Acts in 1984 and 1986, but their impact was as negligible as
that of the 1961 Act.30
The campaign to end dowry-related domestic violence eventually led to
the passage of the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act in 1983, which
introduced Section 498A to the Indian Penal Code (1860).1 Under this
provision, any husband (or his relatives) who inflicts "cruelty" on his wife
could face a criminal fine and imprisonment for up to three years. This is a
cognizable and non-bailable offense. 3 2 Cruelty is defined as any willful
conduct that "is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause
life, has been given this expansive meaning through a series of landmark Supreme
Court judgments. See, e.g., Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory
of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 530 (India) (holding that preventative detention must be
minimally restrictive because Article 21 protects human dignity); Unni Krishnan v.
Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 S.C.R. 594, 703 (India) (extending the right to life to the
right to have a livelihood); People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001, $T 1, 3 (May 2, 2003) (interim order) (India),
available at http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/caselaw show.htm?doc id=401033
(demanding that the right to food be included within the right to life).
27. See INDIA CONST. art. 15(3) ("Nothing in this article shall prevent the State
from making any special provision for women and children.").
28. See LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE-WOMEN'S RIGHTS INITIATIVE, STAYING ALIVE-
5TH MONITORING & EVALUATION 2012 ON THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005, xii (2012) [hereinafter LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE
REPORT] (noting that Article 15 is largely resorted to for the protection of women and
children).
29. See Ghosh & Choudhuri, supra note 19, at 320 (noting that many acts of
violence related to dowry were not reported); see also LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT,
supra note 28, at xii (explaining that the Act could not actually prevent the demand for
and taking of dowry).
30. See Ghosh & Choudhuri, supra note 19, at 320 (showing that dowry deaths
actually increased over time); see also LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT, supra note 28,
at xii (failing also because of the inaction of state officials).
31. See The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, No. 46 of 1983, INDIA PEN.
CODE § 498A (1997) ("Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.").
32. As defined by the first schedule of Code of Criminal Procedure in the criminaljustice system of India, a cognizable offense is a criminal offense in which the police
are empowered to register a First Information Report, investigate, and arrest an accused
without a court issued warrant. A non-bailable offense is one in which the accused
must appear in court to get bail.
2012] 339
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grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical),"
or harassment that involves "coercing [the woman] or any person related to
her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is
on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such
demand."33 However, as we will discuss in Part II, many actions brought
under this law have been defeated due to the inaction or corruption of law
enforcement officials.34
In 1986, Section 304B was added to the IPC and created the new offense
of "dowry death." 3 5 This section holds a woman's husband and in-laws
criminally responsible for death resulting from any burns or other injury
she incurs under suspicious circumstances within seven years of marriage.
There must be a demonstration, however, that the husband or his relatives
36
subjected the woman to "cruelty" in relation to the demand for dowry.
While Section 498A includes everyday domestic violence against
women within its ambit, Section 304B can only be invoked when domestic
violence or the death of a woman are linked with dowry issues. Moreover,
only married women facing violence at the hands of the husband or their
families can claim relief under both these provisions. Thus, violence in
live-in relationships and other non-matrimonial relationships are not
included. These provisions also fail to provide Indian women with civil
remedies such as injunctions, protective orders, interim relief, and other
support services such as shelter and monetary relief.38
Additionally, neither of these provisions holds perpetrators criminally
liable for physical and mental abuse unrelated to dowry demands. For
33. INDIA PEN. CODE § 498A.
34. See LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at xii (explaining that the
nation's policy to council, conciliate, and mediate was preferred); see also LAWYER'S
COLLECTIVE, HANDBOOK ON LAW OF DoMESTIC VIOLENCE xvi (Indira Jaising ed.)
(2009) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE] (noting that the positive
actions of investigation needed to enforce the new laws was often ignored).
35. See The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, No. 43 of 1986, INDIA PEN.
CODE § 304B (1860) ("(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any bums or
bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years
of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with,
any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death,' and such husband or
relative shall be deemed to have caused her death... . (2) Whoever commits dowry
death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.").
36. See id. (demonstrating that the cruelty must specifically relate to dowry, unlike
the general cruelty provided for in section 498A).
37. See id (demanding a showing of cruelty from a husband or member of his
family); INDIA PEN. CODE § 498A (specifying a cause of action against a husband or his
relative).
38. See INDIA PEN. CODE § 304B (providing only for a criminal punishment); INDIA
PEN. CODE § 498A (including only a criminal punishment and monetary fine to the
state).
340
8
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss2/4
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION IN INDIA
example, in Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, a woman suffered severe
emotional and physical abuse at the hands of her husband and his family,
and she eventually committed suicide. 3 9  They regularly beat her and
harassed her for a motorcycle, and, most shockingly, after two months of
marriage, her brother-in-law poured kerosene on her and set her on fire.
She filed a petition alleging cruelty under Section 498A. The Bombay
High Court, however, held that these incidents of domestic violence were
not sufficient to lead her to commit suicide and that the demand for a
motorcycle was not a dowry demand. Even in such a horrific case, Section
498A did not provide relief to a domestic violence victim because the
Court was unwilling to characterize the acts of violence as dowry-related.
Thus, existing laws could not effectively curb domestic violence,
particularly in those cases that did not relate-or were read not to relate-
to dowries or rise to the level of forcing women to commit suicide. 4 0 The
lacunae in the existing laws, coupled with powerful cultural norms against
women's rights, left many domestic violence victims without an effective
remedy.4 1 It was against this backdrop that the Lawyers' Collective started
drafting a bill in 1993.42 After more than a decade of negotiation and
effective lobbying, the Domestic Violence Act was passed in 2005.43
International treaties, agreements, and reports have played an important
role in this lobbying effort. These include the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in
1979, the Mexican Plan of Action in 1975, the Nairobi Forward Looking
Strategies in 1985, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in
1995, the Vienna Accord of 1994,44 and reports by the Special Rapporteur
on Violence Against Women. In 1992, the Committee on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women found that gender-based
violence constitutes discrimination against women and impairs or nullifies
a range of fundamental rights under international human rights law.45 The
39. See Waghmare v. Maharashtra, (1990) Crim.L.J. 407, 3 (Bombay H.C.) (Apr.
10, 1989) (India) (holding that the men's harassment of the woman was not done with
the specific intention of driving her to commit suicide).
40. See LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at 4-5 (pointing out that the
provisions did not expand to situations of sexual or economic violence).
41. See id. (explaining the general lack of support systems that were in place for
women prior to the PWDVA).
42. See Hornbeck et al., supra note 15, at 278-79 (drafting the bill in hopes that it
would provide more options for women looking to review their relationships, stop
violence, and negotiate their domestic issues with dignity).
43. See LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at 3 (taking its framework
from the existing legal situation in India and international standards).
44. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, pmbl.,
INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12.
45. General Recommendation 19, U.N. Committee on Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, f 6-7, 1992, available at http://www.un.org/
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Committee stated that discrimination under the Convention is not restricted
to actions by or on behalf of Governments: states may also be responsible
for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of
rights or to investigate and punish actors of violence, and for providing
compensation.46 The Committee further noted that states should take
comprehensive measures, including the development of a proper legislative
framework to deal with domestic violence.47 In January 2000, the CEDAW
Committee recommended that India pass comprehensive legislative
reforms to promote the human rights of women.4 8
The women's rights movement in India has drawn from these sources to
advocate for gender laws that meet international standards. For example, in
the landmark Vishaka v. Rajasthan litigation, advocates urged the Supreme
Court to draw on international law to fill gaps in the existing legal
framework on sexual harassment. 49  The Court's opinion relied on
CEDAW and other international instruments to adopt guidelines on sexual
harassment in the workplace.so
In 2001, due to pressure from both international and domestic women's
rights organizations, and influenced by the CEDAW recommendations, the
Ministry of Human Resources proposed a Protection from Domestic
Violence Bill on behalf of the Government of India. The bill was later
referred to a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource
Development. The Committee suggested amendments to the bill, which it
submitted in its 124th Report on the Protection from Domestic Violence
Bill, 2002." The bill, including the Standing Committee recommendation,
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm (finding that gender-based
violence seriously inhibits a women's ability to enjoy rights on an equal standard with
men).
46. See id. 9 (specifying that human rights covenants dictate responsibility for the
protection of women against violent private actors).
47. See id. 24(a) (explaining that legislation must be broad enough to cover
private and public actors).
48. See Observations on State Report, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW/C/IND/2-3, T 13, available at
http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/CaseLaw/uncom.nsf/89e6367c3aclba6fcl2567b70027d9fb/d
6acfe9057b04958cl25728100315ff3?OpenDocument (last modified Aug. 26, 2011)
(commanding the need for sensitivity training and the destruction of structural barriers
to women's equality).
49. See Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011, T 15 (India) (arguing that
international conventions and norms play a role in evaluating fundamental rights in the
Constitution of India as related to gender violence and discrimination).
50. See id. 1 27 ("The message of international instruments such as the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 ('CEDAW')
and the Beijing Declaration which directs all State parties to take appropriate measures
to prevent discrimination of all forms against women besides taking steps to protect the
honour and dignity of women is loud and clear.").
51. See Parliament of India, Department-Related Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Resource Development, Hundred Twenty-Fourth Report on the
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was introduced before the Indian Parliament on December 22, 2002.52
B. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA)
finally became law in 2005. It was only passed after a great deal of
parliamentary deliberation to bridge the gap between existing legal
provisions and progressive aims enshrined in the Constitution and
international human rights conventions. The PWDVA provides female
victims of domestic violence legal recourse, both civil and criminal.
Specifically, it allows women to seek injunctions and protective orders,
along with criminal provisions for imprisonment and fines, which come
into play when a perpetrator breaches a civil order. This broader response
to domestic violence more effectively addresses the social realities that
Indian women face, including threats of violence and mental abuse for
which they often require immediate civil remedies.54
Significantly, the PWDVA did not limit protection against domestic
violence to marital relationships. Unlike prior domestic violence
legislation, the PWDVA covers "domestic relationships," which include
"all relationships based on consanguinity, marriage, adoption and even
relationships which were 'in the nature of marriage."' 55 It therefore covers
all women in abusive relationships, regardless of whether the perpetrator is
a spouse, domestic partner, or someone in a live-in relationship. It also
protects unmarried women, siblings, and other women living with the
alleged perpetrator.
The PWDVA also introduced the concept of "right to residence," which
prevents women from being forced out of their marital homes. It also
emphasized the concept of "shared household" that covered women in non-
matrimonial relationships. 5 6 The term "shared household," as defined by
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Bill 1 4 (2002), available at
http://164.100.47.5/book2/reports/HRD/Reportl24th.htm (noting that wide publicity
was given to the proposal and introduction of the bill).
52. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
PROGRAMME-GENDER INJUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA: REPORT ON THE LEGISLATIVE
REVIEW PROJECT IN INDIA 4 (April 2003), available at
http://old.icj.org/IMG/pdf/India workshop final report.pdf (stating that the pressure
and rush to pass such a bill resulted in serious criticism of the bill).
53. See LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at xiii (recognizing
domestic violence as both a criminal and civil issue); see also HANDBOOK OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 34, at xviii (elaborating on the protections of the
PWDVA).
54. LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at xiii (broadening protections
and understanding that domestic violence did not only occur to married women, but
encompassed a much larger issue).
55. See id. (explaining the unprecedented nature of such an extension).
56. See id. (arguing that the new terms introduced to the PWDVA were far more
appropriate because it covered all women in the household rather than just married
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Section 2(s), may include a property of the joint family of which the male
respondent is merely one of several members. By putting a restraint
against alienation, disposal, or renunciation of rights in such a shared
household, the law seeks to virtually shackle the rights of even those who
may not have any role in the dispute from which the controversy has arisen.
Section 20(1) of the PWDVA empowers magistrates to grant monetary
relief in favor of the aggrieved woman.57 This was a very important and
groundbreaking provision. It largely ensures that women who file
complaints under this Act are not pushed out of their houses and, in
disputed cases, women will have a share in the household or the right to
residence and due process protection. Prior to the passage of the PWDVA,
women were thrown out of their marital homes after disputes with their
husbands. Some of them were rendered homeless. 58 Under the PWDVA,
if a woman is forced out of the marital home, a magistrate can pass an
order giving her access to the home. 9 However, the possibility of abuse of
Section 20(l)(d) is writ large when we consider that a female partner in a
live-in relationship that may have only lasted for a month can claim
maintenance allowance under this provision, with no restrictions attached.60
The PWDVA created two new institutions to implement its provisions,
the posts of Protection Officer (PO) and Service Provider (SP).61 The PO,
who is often a woman, is assigned to help abused women seek medical
62
assistance and follow a magistrate's instructions. The SP, on the other
hand, assists with legal work, which ends with the filing of a Domestic
Incident Report (DIR) before a local magistrate.
women).
57. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, §
20(1), INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12.
58. GOPiKA SOLANKI, ADJUDICATION IN RELIGIOUS FAMILY LAWS: CULTURAL
ACCOMMODATION, LEGAL PLURALISM AND GENDER EQUALITY IN INDIA 165 (2011)
(describing the harsh conditions encountered by women prior to the PWDVA).
59. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, §
19(1), INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (granting the magistrate with the power, among
others, to restrain the male's relatives from also entering the home).
60. See id. § 2(a) (defining "aggrieved person" as "any woman who is, or has been,
in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected
to any act of domestic violence by the respondent"); id. § 2(f) (defining "domestic
relationship" to include a female partner in a live-in relationship and extending the
protection of an "aggrieved woman" under the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act).
61. See Sri T. Mathivanan, A Perception on the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, (2008) 4 L.W. (JS) 62 (explaining that both are bound in
duty the moment they learn of a domestic incident).
62. Hornbeck et al., supra note 15, at 289-90 (stating that a Protection Officer must
also inform a woman of her right to apply for a protection order, an order for monetary
relief, a custody order, a compensation order, or a residence order); Mathivanan, supra
note 61 (noting that the functions of the Service Provider are less broad than the
Protection Officer).
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To be clear, the PWDVA does not create any new criminal offenses;
however, if the domestic violence case reveals any offenses punishable
under the Indian Penal Code or Dowry Prohibition Act, magistrates may
frame appropriate charges against the respondent and try cases themselves
or commit them to the Sessions Court as required.63
Unfortunately, the PWDVA did not provide a useful definition of
"respondent." Section 2(q) merely states that "respondent" means "adult
male person," suggesting that women do not fall within its ambit.6 4 Several
High Court decisions have interpreted this provision to include women as
respondents, recognizing that, in India, domestic violence is often
perpetrated by female in-laws.s
The Indian Parliament eventually clarified the definition of "respondent"
by adding a proviso to this section. The proviso includes an accused man's
female relatives in the definition, where the victim is a wife or woman
living in a relationship in the nature of marriage. This means that victims
of domestic violence can file cases against not only male but also female
perpetrators.
According to the National Crime Bureau in 2006, there was an 8.2% rise
in the number of reported domestic violence cases since 2005 under
Section 498A of the IPC.6 7 More strikingly, the Bureau reported a 12.2%
increase in the number of cases filed since 2005 under Section 304B of the
IPC (dowry deaths).6 8 In total, then, reported crimes against women
increased by 5.9% during 2006.69
Given the private nature of domestic violence crimes-where women are
either too ashamed or too afraid to report many incidences of violence-
this is a statistic that should be welcomed. Far from showing an increase in
63. Mathivanan, supra note 61 (explaining that the Act was designed to protect
women from incidences of domestic violence both explicit and dormant).
64. Amita Punj & Arvendra Singh, The Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005: Can Women Be "Respondents "?-An Appraisal of Section 2 (q),
2010 (1) S.C.C. (Jour.) 23 (defining the respondent as an adult male person).
65. See id (noting that courts have expressed differing views as to whether the
proviso includes females); see also Sarita v. Umrao, (2008) 1 R.Cr.D. 97 (Rajasthan
H.C.) (India) (arguing that had females meant to be excluded, the legislature would
have provided for a specific exclusion); Nand Kishore v. Rajasthan, (2008) 4 R.L.W.
3432 (Rajasthan H.C.) (India) (dismissing an action to quash a complaint against a
female relative because Section 2(q) of the PWDVA did not exclude female relatives as
respondents).
66. See Mathivanan, supra note 61 (adding also that a male child may complain
along with his mother).
67. See National Crime Records Bureau, Report: Crime in 2006, in HANDBOOK OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 34, at xiv (demonstrating the incidence of torture,
defined as "cruelty by husband and relatives," in India in 2006).
6 8. Id.
69. See id. (including crimes committed under Special and Local Laws).
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domestic violence, it shows that this historically underreported crime is
finally being addressed with the passage of the PWDVA in 2005.
II. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT
A. Victimization of Male Partners and Their Female Relatives
The need for the PWDVA arose because of the ineffectiveness and
misuse of existing laws to curb violence against women. 70 However, the
introduction of the PWDVA raises concerns of false complaints. It has
also been criticized for neglecting men who experience domestic abuse.72
For example, "[o]rganizations like Save Indian Family claim that they are
approached for help by a large number of males complaining of harassment
by women, even violence."7 In addition, a study on police and prisons
acknowledged that Indian domestic violence laws have been misused by
victims and by the police and put forth recommendations to streamline the
laws.74 Still, there is no data to establish with any accuracy the extent of
this misuse.
The Act has also been criticized for its lack of clarity and ambiguities.
For instance, the Act includes "insults" and "jibes" under the definition of
"verbal and emotional abuse" in Explanation I (iii) of Section 3 of the Act,
without defining these terms.75 The phrase "mental and verbal abuse"
therefore has the potential to be misinterpreted. It might, in some cases, be
extended to mere domestic quarrels that were not intended to fall under the
definition of mental and verbal abuse.76  A comprehensive study on
70. See M.A. Mony v. M.P. Leelamma, (2007) Crim.L.J. 2604, 8 (explaining that
Parliament introduced the law because it felt that the civil law did not provide relief to
a woman subjected to domestic violence); XIV Lok Sabha Debates, 23 August 2005,
available at http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/DebateAdvSearchl4.aspx
(describing the problem of domestic violence as "seeing yet unseeing" and the general
inaction by courts to positively affect domestic violence problems).
71. See SUMAN RAI, LAW RELATING TO PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 568 (2008) (advocating for restraint and privacy when dealing with domestic
issues and decrying the use of the law as a "facilitator for breaking up families").
72. See id. (contending that the government was insensitive to men in passing such
a law, which offers no protection to the man from a "shrewish" woman).
73. See Ghosh & Choudhuri, supra note 19, at 323 (admitting that the PWDVA
may be misused).
74. See N.K. Singhal, Crimes Against Women-Role of Section 498-A, IPC in
States of Delhi and Haryana (2002), in RESEARCH STUDIES ON POLICE AND PRISON
ISSUES (1970-2009) 257-58, available at http://bprd.nic.in/index2.asp?
slid=378&sublinkid=160&lang=l (elaborating that the definition of cruelty be more
precise, and among other recommendations, that the applicability of 306 be limited to
suicide by the wife and not other unnatural deaths).
75. Ghosh & Choudhuri, supra note 19, at 323.
76. See id. (noting that ambiguities in the law increase apprehension of its misuse).
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domestic violence showed that a significant portion of domestic quarrels
arise out of a husband's refusal to move to a separate house, late-night
shifts at work for either partner, and disputes over household
responsibilities between relatives, including parents, siblings, and in-laws.7 7
In many cases, therefore, these quarrels do not rise to the level of domestic
violence and should not be prosecuted as such.
The PWDVA has been challenged for excluding men from bringing
domestic violence claims. The constitutional validity of the PWDVA was
challenged before the Delhi High Court in Aruna Parmod Shah v. Union of
India on the ground that it is unconstitutionally gender-specific. However,
the Court upheld the Act, stating:
The argument that the Act is ultra vires the Constitution of India because
it accords protection only to women and not to men is, therefore, wholly
devoid of any merit. We do not rule out the possibility of a man
becoming the victim of domestic violence, but such cases would be few
and far between, thus not requiring or justifying the protection of
Parliament.78
The PWDVA defines "respondent" as any male adult person who has
been, or is, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person. 79 The
Court held that the gender-specific nature of the PWDVA was a reasonable
classification in view of the Act's object and purpose, and that the Act was
therefore constitutional. The Court further held that "[1]ike treatment to
both does not, in any manner, derogate from the sanctity of marriage since
an assumption can fairly be drawn that a 'live-in relationship' is invariably
initiated and perpetuated by the male."80
Similarly, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ajay Kant v. Smt. Alka
Sharma stated:
[I]t is clear by the definition of respondent that for obtaining any relief
under this Act an application can be filed or a proceeding can be initiated
against only adult male person and on such application or under such
proceeding, aforementioned protection order can be passed. Obviously
those orders will also be passed only against the adult male person. As
provided under Section 31 of the Act, non-compliance of a protection
77. See id. (elaborating on the superficial nature of many domestic quarrels,
including disputes over gifts to relatives).
78. See Aruna Parmod Shah v. Union of India, (2008) 102 D.R.J. 543 (Delhi H.C.)(Apr. 7, 2008) (India) (contending that the perceptions that brought forth the
protections for women in India were justified and founded).
79. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, §
2(q), INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (providing that an aggrieved wife or female living in a
relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of
the husband or male partner).
80. See Shah, 102 D.R.J. T 5 (noting that the court should not be "impervious" to
social stigmas against women when making such decisions).
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order or an interim protection order has been made punishable and as
such it can be said that the complaint for this offence can only be filed
against such adult male person/respondent who has not complied with
the protection order. Hence, it is clear that the application under Section
12 of the Act which has been filed by the respondent against petitioner
Nos. 3 and 4, who are not adult male persons, is not maintainable.8 1
However, this interpretation has been held to contradict the Indian
Parliament's intent, as the Parliament clarified the definition of
"respondent" by adding a proviso that includes an accused man's female
relatives in the definition, where the victim is a wife or woman living in a
82
relationship in the nature of marriage. In Sandhya Manoj Wankhde v.
Manoj Bhimrao Wankhde, the Supreme Court granted an appeal to set
aside the impugned order of the Bombay High Court, which stated that the
term "respondent" under the PWDVA meant adult male person, who is or
has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person. The Court
held that the proviso widened the scope of the definition including a
relative of the husband or the male partner and noted that no authority had
ever given a restrictive meaning to the term "relative." 84 It added, "[I]t is
clear that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the
husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made
under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005."" Therefore,
women can bring claims under the PWDVA against female relatives of
their male partners. However, the Supreme Court did not hold that men
86
could bring domestic violence suits against their female partners.
Section 18 of the PWDVA empowers magistrates to issue prohibitory
orders upon prima facie satisfaction that "domestic violence has taken
place or is likely to take place."87 It is important to note that a magistrate
81. Ajay Kant v. Smt. Alka Sharma, (2008) Crim. L.J. 264 (Madhya Pradesh H.C.)
(June 19, 2007) (India).
82. See LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at 144 (resting its argument
on the fact that the legislature did not specifically exclude females); Mathivanan, supra
note 61 (extending the definition of respondent to female relatives living in the same
household as the complainant).
83. See Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade, (2011) 3 S.C.C.
650 (India) (arguing that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives).
84. Id.
8 5. Id.
86. See id. (restricting the discussion of statutory interpretation to the term
"respondent" and not to terms regarding the complainant).
87. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, §
18, INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 ("The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved
person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie
satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a
protection order in favor of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from-(a)
committing any act of domestic violence; (b) aiding or abetting in the commission of
acts of domestic violence; (c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person
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may issue an injunction against the male perpetrator prohibiting him from
entering any place that may be "frequented by the aggrieved person" or
from operating a bank account "enjoyed by both the parties," even if that
account was held solely by the respondent. Needless to say, places
"frequented by the aggrieved person" include the house in which both
partners resided before the alleged domestic violence took place. The
house in question might be owned or rented by the male respondent where
the aggrieved woman has no right, title, or interest. Thus, the magistrate
may deprive the male respondent of access to his own house and bank
account under this section.89
Furthermore, Section 23 empowers magistrates to pass interim orders in
the course of any proceedings before them that would include a Section 18
order. 90 Under Section 23, upon prima facie satisfaction "on the basis of
the affidavit," inter alia, that the application discloses that "there is a
likelihood" of domestic violence being committed, he may grant an ex
parte protection order under Section 18.91 Section 25 further states that a
protection order under Section 18 shall be in force "till the aggrieved
person applies for discharge." 9 2
Thus, if a woman alleges some misconduct by the male respondent with
whom she has lived in a shared household, and approaches a magistrate
with an application under Section 18 (read in conjunction with Section 23
asserting, on affidavit, that the latter is likely to subject her to emotional
abuse), the magistrate can issue an ex parte interim protection order
prohibiting the respondent from entering his own house or operating his
own bank account. 93
or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the
aggrieved person; (d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the
aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic
contact; (e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held
or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or
singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held eitherjointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate; (f)
causing violence to the dependents, other relatives or any person who give the
aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence; (g) committing any other act as
specified in the protection order.").
88. See R.K. Gauba, Domestic Violence Law-A Recipe for Disaster?, (2007) 8
S.C.C. (J) 25 (arguing that such protections seem to have "gone overboard").
89. See id. (contending that actions allowed by the PWDVA may essentially render
a man homeless and without monetary resources).
90. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, No. 43 of
2005, § 23, INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (providing that a Magistrate may pass interim
orders for proceedings including protection orders, residence orders, orders for
monetary relief, custody orders, and compensation orders).
9 1. Id.
92. See id § 25 (granting the Magistrate the power to alter, revoke, or modify an
order if he is satisfied there has been a change in circumstances).
93. See id. §§ 18, 19, 23 (establishing the right to protection and residence orders
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In this situation, the respondent does not have an opportunity to contest
the allegations against him, as Section 23 allows magistrates to grant ex
parte orders. Moreover, Section 31 of the PWDVA makes the breach of an
interim order a cognizable criminal offense.94 Together, these laws allow
female petitioners to obtain protection orders without having their
allegations contested and, if an order is breached, they can bring criminal
charges against respondents.
Section 17 of the PWDVA sets forth the right of the aggrieved woman to
reside in a shared household.95 "The right is absolute and subject to denial
only in the event of eviction or being excluded in accordance with the
procedure established by law."9 6 The procedure for securing this right is
found in Section 19, which also sets out the elements that can be introduced
in residence orders. However, the PNWDVA does not establish procedures
through which an affected respondent can secure an order of eviction or
exclusion against the female petitioner. Thus, the respondent cannot avail a
legal remedy against his female partner with whom this right to reside was
never intended.97
Some of the restraining orders available under Section 19 are susceptible
to misuse. These include orders: "([1]) directing the respondent to remove
himself from the shared household; . . . ([2]) restraining the respondent
from alienating or disposing [ofj the shared household ... ; [and (3)]
restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared
household except with the leave of the Magistrate."98 That the respondent
might be ordered to leave the shared household may not only be unjust, but
also harms the possibility of reconciliation between the parties. 99
The next sub-section looks at police corruption, harassment, and non-
action in domestic violence cases.
and the implementation of such orders by a magistrate); Gauba, supra note 88 (noting
that an aggrieved woman may not even have a right, title, or interest to such property
without the order).
94. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, §
31, INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (punishing the breach of an interim protection order
with up to one year in prison, or a fine of up to twenty thousand rupees, or both).
95. See id. § 17 (granting shared household rights regardless of whether the woman
has any right, title, or beneficial interest in the household).
96. Gauba, supra note 88.
97. See id. (stating that because the PWDVA is a special law favoring a special
class of women, it cannot be controlled by the existing legal framework).
98. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, §
19, INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (providing also that the Magistrate may require the
respondent to obtain alternate accommodation for the aggrieved woman either at the
same level as she was living or require the respondent to pay her rent).
99. See Gauba, supra note 88 (arguing that the harsh provisions of the PWDVA do
not provide for encouragement to save the marriage, even when innocent children are
involved).
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B. Police Harassment
Police failures to properly investigate domestic violence and implement
judicial orders have long prevented domestic violence victims in India from
receiving justice. Corruption in local police forces is rampant. The police
are often reluctant to press charges against or investigate influential
persons t 00 Those with strong political ties or economic standing are often
able to persuade the police to act in their favor. 01
Women's rights advocates argue that the lack of training of police
officers and magistrates regarding the Act's requirements and its purpose,
combined with a lack of sensitivity training towards the issue of domestic
violence, has weakened the Act's enforcement.102 This lack of training
leads to the re-victimization of women, as the police either fail to respond
to calls for help or send women "back home to their abusers by branding
their victimization as mere domestic disputes."1 03 "One female [victim] in
West Bengal spoke of the insensitivity she faced at the hands of officers
who believed her abuser's stories that she was a prostitute, and dismissed
her pleas for aid and told her she should be ashamed" for seeking police
104
assistance.
Widespread police and judicial corruption also limit the PWDVA's
effectiveness. 05 Though corruption is difficult to measure, it is widely
believed that some Indian police officers and judges purposely choose not
to enforce domestic violence laws. 10 6 It has been reported that the police
often fail to properly report and investigate domestic violence and dowry-
related deaths. This unwillingness to investigate and report incidents of
domestic violence can be attributed to the widespread view "that domestic
violence is a family problem and should be dealt with privately." 0 7
100. See Ghosh & Choudhuri, supra note 19, at 327 (explaining that the apathy of
police leads to further suffering of domestic violence victims).
101. See id (discussing a case in which a domestic case was brought to the notice of
a protection officer but no formal complaints were lodged).
102. See RAKHI LAHIRI, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW NETWORK, THE PROTECTION OF
WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT: THE CURRENT SITUATION 5 (2009), available
at http://www.hrln.org/hrln/pdf/intern work/PWDVA%20Article%20-Rakhi%20Lahiri
formatted%20by%2OKaruna .pdf (discussing the failure in the implementation of the
PWDVA's protection and traiiiing provisions).
103. See id. (stating that women also face the problem of magistrates continuing
cases, which forces women to return home to their abusers and the site of their trauma).
104. See id. (noting that many police stations in West Bengal treat domestic violence
cases as 498A complaints that have a much higher threshold of cruelty to warrant a
criminal complaint).
105. See Hornbeck et al., supra note 15, at 288 (examining the sources that threaten
the efficacy of the PWDVA, including judicial inefficiency).
106. See id. (purporting that police officers may refuse assistance because of the
PWDVA's lack of a criminal remedy).
107. See id (accepting that police officers' inaction is a conscious choice).
3512012]
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As a result, many victims fear that their complaints will not be taken
seriously if reported to the police. This fear almost certainly leads to the
underreporting of domestic violence claims. 08 Not surprisingly, then, the
adequacy of police investigations into dowry-related crimes and domestic
violence has historically been low.1 09
The PWDVA contains several provisions aimed at addressing these
concerns, particularly with regard to the conduct of the police in handling
domestic violence cases. Most importantly, the Act mandates that police
participate in sensitization and awareness training.no Moreover, some
police districts have added female police officers to their police force to
encourage a greater number of victims to report domestic violence
incidents."' Despite these reforms, police corruption remains a significant
impediment to the effective enforcement of the PWDVA." 2
III. MISUSE OF OTHER LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS: INDIAN PENAL CODE
SECTION 498A AND THE DOWRY PROHIBITION AMENDMENT SECTION
304B
A. The Constitutionality of Section 498A
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is the provision most commonly
relied upon by women who have experienced domestic violence. A female
petitioner has the right to file a complaint under Section 498A along with
an application under the PWDVA.1' 3 Both the PWDVA and Section 498A
use similar tests of injury and harassment. Section 498A also expressly
recognizes grave injury to the mental health of a woman to constitute the
offense of "cruelty.""14
However, because of its propensity for misuse, the constitutional validity
of Section 498A has been challenged in a number of cases."' In Sushil
108. See id. at 292 (detailing how women also underreport for fear of being
subjected to additional violence).
109. See id. at 292-93 (stating that when investigations do occur, evidence gathering
and documentation are insufficient and "lackadaisical" at best).
110. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, §
11, INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (providing that such provisions of the act be given wide
publicity through the public media).
111. See Hornbeck et al., supra note 15, at 293 (discussing All-Women Police Units
created to reunify families through counseling).
112. See id. at 286 (arguing that the PWDVA cannot succeed without cooperation
among police and successful dissemination of information regarding the PWDVA).
113. See HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 34, at 146 (creating a
cause of action for a woman subjected to cruelty by her husband).
114. See id. (defining cruelty expressly as "willful conduct").
115. See id. at 147 (noting that the constitutionality of 498A has been challenged on
various grounds).
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Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, the husband of a woman who had filed a
complaint against him under Section 498A challenged its constitutional
validity on the grounds that it is frequently misused.' 16 The Supreme Court
dismissed this claim, holding that the mere possibility of misuse did not
render a provision invalid.l17 However, the Court's final words
summarized the potential issues with this provision:
The object of the provision is the prevention of the dowry meance [sic].
But as has been rightly contented by the petitioner many instances have
come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and have been filed
with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all
cases wipe out the ignomy [sic] suffered during and prior to trial ....
Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not
give a license to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or
unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the
legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or
allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to
take care of the situation within the existing framework. As noted above
the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the
provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is
intended to be used a shield and not an assassin's weapon. If cry of
"wolf' is made too often as a prank assistance and protection may not be
available when the actual "wolf' appears.
The Court, in other words, recognized the prospective danger that this
provision could be misused, but nonetheless held that it was constitutional
because the petitioner had not demonstrated that such misuse had actually
occurred.
In Inder Raj v. Sunita, the Delhi High Court dealt with a challenge to the
constitutional validity of Section 498A on the grounds that it violated the
right to equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. The petition
argued that Section 498A provides arbitrary powers to the police and that
the definition of "cruelty" is unconstitutionally vague.' The Court upheld
the provision, stating that the word "cruelty" is well defined in the law, and
its interpretation would therefore not be arbitrary. 12 0 The Court went on to
state that if conferring wide discretion to courts in interpreting laws is itself
116. See Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (2005) 6 S.C.C. 281 (India),
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/l 172674/ (arguing that 498A leads to
persecution because of the sympathies associated with dowry torture).
117. See id (expressing disapproval over the misuse of 498A but explaining that
simple misuse does not constitute unconstitutionality).
118. Id.
119. See Inder Raj v. Sunita, (1986) Crim.L.J. 1510 (Delhi H.C.), available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/322263/ (arguing that the term is so vague that cruelty and
harassment could mean the same thing).
120. See id. (stating that there is no arbitrary exercise of power in defining either
harassment or cruelty because both words are well known).
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the conferring of arbitrary powers, then most of the provisions of law
would also have to be struck down as ultra vires.' 2 1 The Court noted that it
had the discretion to punish an offender for the same offense for up to ten
years, which can lead to some arbitrariness. Still, it concluded that Indian
law clearly establishes that such discretion is not arbitrary and thus does
not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.12 2
In Krishan Lal v. Union of India, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
held that Article 14 of the Constitution requires that all persons similarly
situated be treated equally. 123 However, the government may differentiate
among people based on reasonable classifications.124  In this light, the
Court held that the classification of a husband and his relatives-for the
purpose of imposing criminal punishment-is reasonable, especially when
the alleged violence takes place within the marital home where it is
difficult to gather evidence. Thus, it held that Section 498A did not violate
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
B. The Misuse of Section 498A
While its constitutionality has been upheld, Section 498A appears to be
frequently misused by the police. There is a widespread belief among the
Indian public that this provision is used primarily to file false charges to
harass or blackmail an innocent spouse and his relatives.12 5 The court in
Verrulu v. The State demanded a stop to the unhealthy trend of false
complaints that had been resulting in unnecessary misery to the husband
and his relatives.' 26 In Sapneswar Dehuri v. State of Orissa, another court
observed that the killing of daughters-in-law for the non-fulfillment of
demands has "undoubtedly" become rampant, but it noted that even in a
case where a young bride dies a natural death, eyebrows are raised and
suspicion is immediately cast on the in-laws.' 27
121. See id. (expressing that the court has the duty and latitude to interpret terms but
had not done so in the present case).
122. See id (affirming that discretion in sentencing is wholly within the power of
the court).
123. See Krishnan Lal v. Union of India, (1994) Crim.L.J. 3472 (Punjab & Haryana
H.C.), available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1632112/ ("[A]ny invidious
discrimination is obnoxious to equality.").
124. See id. (explaining that Article 14 forbids class legislation generally but permits
reasonable classification, provided that it is founded on an "intelligible differentia,"
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left
out of the group and the differentia has a rational nexus to the object sought to be
achieved by the legislation in question).
125. See V.K. DEWAN, LAw RELATING TO DOWRY PROHIBITION 184 (2010)
(explaining that the trend of false claims is a glaring reality).
126. See id. (positing that a "psychopath wife" may have chosen to commit suicide
for reasons other than cruelty).
127. See id (demonstrating that statutory provisions may be misused in such
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According to its critics, Section 498A of the IPC is a poorly and vaguely
formulated law that allows women to file frivolous lawsuits that lead to
innocent men and their relatives being arrested without investigation. Pro-
male activists claim that the social consequence of such prosecution has led
to suicides by accused married men.12 8 They also claim that married
women often use this provision to blackmail their husbands and in-laws to
accede to their demands at the brink of a divorce.129 Thus, marital discord
is disguised as domestic violence or "cruelty." If these reports of false
claims are accurate, it would constitute an abuse of due process, for this
provision was intended to be a shield against violence, not "a sword or
bargaining tool." 30
Publications such as Manushi, a magazine devoted to gender studies,
have also highlighted the misuse of such laws while lauding their efficacy
in certain cases.131  According to Manushi, female complainants often
allege threats of dowry demands in complaints of domestic violence or
cruelty, even when dowry is not at issue.132 Lawyers and police officers are
reported to have encouraged complainants to make these false allegations
to implicate the male partner's family members in these lawsuits.13 3
Madhu Kishwar, a noted advocate of women's rights, has also cited
examples of phony dowry allegation cases that were heavily publicized in
the media.13 4
Unscrupulous families might also exaggerate claims or invent false
claims under Sections 498A and 406 of the IPC to use as bargaining tools
to demand the return of more than was given as stridhan.135  Similarly,
situations).
128. See Siddesh Inamdar, Husbands Allege Misuse of Domestic Violence Act, THE
HINDU (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/other-states/
article38941.ece (detailing that for every 100 male suicides, 45 are married).
129. See Madhu Purnima Kishwar, Destined to Fail: Inherent Flaws in the Anti-
dowry Legislation, MANUSHI, http://www.manushi.in/articles.php?articleld=1061 (last
visited Sept. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Kishwar, Destined to Fail] (calling for the
scrapping of the anti-dowry law because of its role as a root of illegal extortion).
130. See MAJUMDAR AND KATARIA, LAW OF DOWRY PROHIBITION, CRUELTY AND
HARASSMENT 94 (2010).
131. See Kishwar, Destined to Fail, supra note 129 (noting that misuse claims are
not only brought by in-laws and husbands, but by women's organizations as well).
132. See id. (noting that Section 498A provides a strong weapon for revenge for
women, whether or not the source of discord is the dowry).
133. See Kishwar, Laws Against Domestic Violence, supra note 23 (purporting that
implicating the whole family will result in a larger financial settlement for the woman).
134. See Kishwar, Destined to Fail, supra note 129 (describing the case of Nisha
Harma who accused and called for the arrest of her groom and his parents the night
before their wedding over fake dowry demands).
135. See id. Stridhan is defined as that portion of a woman's wealth over which she
alone has the power to sell, gift, mortgage, lease or exchange-in whole or in part.
Usually, stridhan is passed from mother to daughter, unless the woman decides
otherwise. Any dues from her can also be recovered from her stridhan. Besides the
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women are encouraged to overstate their claims of domestic violence to
demand an enhanced settlement as a pre-condition for divorce by mutual
consent. Thus, a large number of cases filed under Section 498A are
subsequently withdrawn.136
Manushi also unearthed several cases where lawyers advised their male
clients to preempt their wives' filing a Section 498A complaint against
them by filing a divorce petition before the Section 498A claim is brought
to the police.137 These men are then able to reasonably argue that charges
of "cruelty" were simply false charges filed in retaliation against the
husband's petition for divorce.
Manushi's investigations revealed that police would often use the threat
of arrest under Section 498A to extort large sums of money from a
husband's family.138  Likewise, many have alleged that the police
threatened to oppose or delay the granting of bail to accused men and their
families, unless they produced large bribes. 139 Others allege that lawyers
encourage complainants to exaggerate the amount owed to them as
stridhan. This ensures that the lawyers themselves receive large
settlements from their male clients, provided they were entitled to a
percentage of the settlement as a commission for coercing the husband's
family. 140
The Malimath Committee Reportl41 on the criminal justice system
concluded that Section 498A helps neither the wife nor the husband in a
domestic violence situation.14 2 Since it makes "cruelty" both a non-bailable
and non-compoundable offense, innocent individuals are regularly arrested
and imprisoned, leading to stigmatization and both mental and physical
ornaments and trousseau given at marriage, stridhan also includes all the gifts of
money, property, jewelry, and so on received by the woman before, during, and after
the marriage.
136. See Kishwar, Laws Against Domestic Violence, supra note 23 (noting that even
when the goal of returning all of her rightful belongings is reasonable, the use of
Section 498A still constitutes an abuse of the provision).
137. See id. (creating a situation in which the woman must now fight a defensive
divorce case).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, Gov'T OF INDIA, COMM. ON REFORMS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Sys., REPORT 3 (2003), available at http://mha.nic.in/pdfs
/criminal justice system.pdf. In 2003, the Government of India's Ministry of Home
Affairs constituted the Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System to undertake
a comprehensive examination of all aspects of the criminal justice system, fundamental
principles, and relevant laws. This report highlighted lacunae in the Indian criminal
justice system and suggested important recommendations.
142. See id. at 191 (demonstrating that after an investigation occurs, a woman may
not be able to return home even if she wants to and is at the mercy of her natal family,
while her husband may also not be able to return home if he is in prison).
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hardships. According to the Report, reconciliation or return to the marital
home becomes practically impossible as a result. 14 3 For instance, even if
the petitioner wishes to make amends by withdrawing the complaint, she
cannot do so because the offense cannot be withdrawn (non-
compoundable). Thus, men accused of inflicting "cruelty" against their
wives are unlikely to return to a normal family life.14 4
However, the Malimath Committee's insistence on reconciliation and
compromise raises serious concerns. 14 Almost certainly, a large
percentage of women who approach the state or non-governmental
organizations for help in a domestic violence case must return to violent
domestic situations.146 Both the state and NGOs recommend a process of
"mediation" between husband and wife to resolve their differences, in
which the woman negotiates from a disadvantageous position because of
strong patriarchal cultural norms. Thus, in many cases, the woman might
feel compelled to withdraw her criminal complaint against a violent
husband as a precondition for a settlement or for an easy divorce.147
In light of the Malimath Committee Report, a petition alleging the
misuse of Section 498A was admitted by the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of
Parliament) Committee on Petitions in 2011.148 This angered many
women's rights organizations, which claimed that any misuse resulted from
sloppy investigation by the police and argued that any amendment to this
law would constitute a regressive step in women's rights laws in India. 14 9
They also argued that the possibility of a large number of women falsifying
incidents of violence and harassment was not only remote but also
143. See id. (noting that legal obstacles can make reconciliation unrealistic).
144. See id (stating that men are often suspended from or lose their jobs as a result
of such charges).
145. See AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT OF THE MALIMATH COMMITTEE ON REFORMS OF
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: SOME OBSERVATIONS 25-26 (Sept. 19, 2003)
[hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L REPORT], available at http://www.amnesty.org/fr/
library/info/ASA20/025/2003/en (explaining that the insistence on mediation is often
due to a lack of choices for women to escape a violent situation).
146. See id at 25 (noting that the woman is placed at a severe disadvantage in the
patriarchal process, especially with the lack of police follow-up after mediation has
returned the parties home).
147. See id at 26 (explaining that Section 498A does not protect a woman's right to
the matrimonial home).
148. See RAJYA SABHA, COMM. ON PETITIONS, PETITION PRAYING FOR AMENDMENTS
IN SECTION 498A OF IPC (n.d.), available at http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/
press release/Press/Committee%20on%20Petitions/498%20IPC%20English.pdf
(alleging that the abuse constitutes "tremendous harassment and torture").
149. See T.K. Rajalakshmi, Oppressor's Case, Women's Organisations Rise Up
Against a Petition That Seeks an Amendment to Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code,
FRONTLINE (Mar. 26-Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2807/stories/
20110408280709600.htm (arguing that the petition portrayed aggrieved women who
brought complaints as dishonorable women, or "Delilahs and Jezebels").
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improbable. "0
National Crime Bureau data from 2008 revealed that the number of
dowry deaths had increased from 6,975 cases in 1998 to 8,093 in 2007."'
Cases registered under Section 498A had also increased from 41,375 to
75,930 (almost doubled), while the reported number of sexual harassment
cases had grown from 8,053 to 10,950 in the same ten-year period.15 2 This,
of course, reveals only that the number of reported cases increased, but
does not tell us about the incidence of domestic violence cases or about the
misuse of the provision.
This underscores an important limitation in the debate over false
complaints: the absence of good data. For instance, Amnesty International
observed that the Malimath Committee provides no data to show how
frequently Section 498A is being misused.153  This suggests that the
Committee's recommendations were based on rumor rather than empirical
research. The only available empirical study on the alleged "misuse" of
498A was published by the Centre for Social Research, which found that
6.5 percent of the dowry harassment cases they studied were found to be
false at the time of investigation. 154 While this study suggests that the
number of false complaints filed is low, most organizations fighting to
repeal or amend Section 498A have relied on the findings of the Malimath
Committee Report, which assumes a much higher percentage of false
complaints. 15
Amnesty International also reported that a large number of cases of
violence against women were subsequently logged as "false" after the
filing of an initial complaint.'56  This usually meant that the victim had
150. See id. (contending that because silence and marriage are extolled values in
India, it is highly improbable that women would fake incidences of domestic violence).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 145, at 25 (arguing that most "false"
claims were actually situations in which the victim and perpetrator of violence had
reached a compromise and a complaint had been withdrawn).
154. See The Storm Around 498A, THE HINDU, Mar. 8, 2011,
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-karnataka/articlel518769.ece
(finding that only .1% of domestic violence incidents even reach the criminal justice
system).
155. See Anupam Bhagria, Amend Domestic Violence Act to Plug Its Misuse Against
Men, Demands NGO, INDIAN ExPRESS (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.indianexpress.com/
news/amend-domestic-violence-act-to-plug-its-misu/527991/ (advocating for an
amendment to Section 498A by contending that it harms minor girls, children, fathers,
pregnant women, and aged grandmothers more than it helps protect women); see also
Nitesh Kumar Sharma, Jaipur Men Victim of False Dowry Cases, TIMES OF INDIA
(Mar. 20, 2009), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-03-20/jaipur/
28055005_1 dowry-harassment-domestic-violence-cases (calling for reform by
pointing out a case in which a physically-challenged man was falsely charged with
domestic violence and almost lost his job).
156. See AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 145, at 25 (reporting that thirty percent
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reached a compromise with the perpetrator, witnesses had turned hostile, or
the petitioner chose to withdraw her complaint for other reasons.15' The
labeling of these complaints as "false," though, is problematic, for it
implies that women have falsely or maliciously lodged complaints, which
benefits those who argue that women misuse legislation against domestic
violence.' 58 In other words, the incidence of misuse of Section 498A is
exaggerated because of this labeling. Still, in light of the lack of concrete
data regarding misuse, a detailed study of "false" and retaliatory cases is
necessary to determine exactly to what extent Section 498A has been
misused and whether that misuse outweighs its benefits as a tool to provide
relief to victims of domestic violence.
India is not alone in struggling to protect women from domestic
violence. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that
the United States does not have a legal framework that consistently protects
and provides relief for victims of domestic violence.
IV. JESSICA LENAHAN (GONZALES) V. UNITED STATES AND THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION'S APPROACH TO EQUALITY
In Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, the Inter-American
Commission published a detailed report, which concluded, inter alia, that
the United States violated one of its citizen's right to equality and non-
discrimination under Article II of the American Declaration.15' The
Commission stressed that international law requires states to act with "due
diligence" to protect women from domestic violence. 16 0 The Commission
recommended that the United States adopt special protection measures and
take positive action to protect at-risk groups, including young women.161
These measures include legislation to make the enforcement of protective
orders mandatory and the creation of "effective implementation
mechanisms" accompanied by "adequate resources to foster their
implementation."' 62 The Commission further suggested training programs
of cases were filed as false in the Rajasthan government).
157. See id. (detailing that cases of withdrawal made up forty percent of the Section
498A filings).
158. See id (noting that the rumor of misuse is furthered by the police andjudiciary).
159. See Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, 5 (2011) (concluding that the United States failed to act with due
diligence).
160. See id. T 160 (expressing that the state was not coordinated, or ready to
adequately implement the restraining order).
161. See id. 1 201 (detailing recommendations including an exhaustive investigation
of the case at issue).
162. See id. 201(4) (recommending that such goals be implemented through law
enforcement and justice training programs as well as model protocols and directives by
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for law enforcement and judicial officials to reverse stereotypes about
domestic violence victims and to help end "discriminatory socio-cultural
patterns" that prevent women from receiving the full protection of the
law. 6 3
This section will examine the Inter-American Commission Report's
findings and recommendations with regard to the right to equality and the
due diligence principle. It will also compare the Report to the Supreme
Court's decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, which held that Ms.
Lenahan failed to state a cognizable claim for relief under the U.S.
Constitution. To provide the proper context for this comparison, we will
set first set forth the facts of this case on which both the Commission and
the Supreme Court relied.
A. Facts of the Case
The facts underlying Jessica Lenahan's lawsuit are truly horrific. Ms.
Lenahan, who is of Native American and Latin American descent, married
Simon Gonzales in 1990.164 They lived in Castle Rock, Colorado and had
three daughters: Leslie, Katheryn, and Rebecca.165 In 1999, Ms. Lenahan
obtained a valid restraining order against her husband, Simon Gonzales.16 6
The order granted Ms. Lenahan temporary sole custody of her three
daughters and limited Mr. Gonzales' interactions with the girls to "a mid-
week dinner visit" that had to be arranged "upon reasonable notice" and
alternate weekends.'67  The order included a warning for Mr. Gonzales,
stating that "a knowing violation of a restraining order is a crime" and that
he "may be arrested" if police officers had probable cause to believe that he
knowingly violated the order.16 8  It also included a "Notice to Law
Enforcement Officials," which read, in relevant part, that they "shall use
every reasonable means to enforce this restraining order." 6 9
The order was issued to protect Ms. Lenahan and her daughters from Mr.
Gonzales' "erratic and emotionally" abusive behavior towards them, which
police departments throughout the country).
163. See id T 201(6) (recommending the adoption of public policies and
institutional programs for all public officials).
164. Id. 18.
165. Id.
166. See id. 62 (showing that the temporary restraining order was valid May 21,
1999, and then rendered permanent on June 4, 1999).
167. See id. T 63 (noting that Jessica Lenahan and Simon Gonzales arranged for him
to have the children on Wednesday nights following the permanent order).
168. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (Castle Rock IV), 545 U.S. 748, 751-52
(2005) (noting that because this case came to the Supreme Court from the dismissal of
a complaint, the Court assumed the truth of Ms. Lenahan's allegations).
169. See id. at 752 (calling for the arrest of Mr. Gonzales, or, if not possible,
retention of a warrant for his arrest in case of a breach of the violation).
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included verbal, physical, and sexual abuse, and threats to kidnap the
children. 7 e Prior to the issuance of the order, Ms. Lenahan had reported at
least four incidents of domestic violence to the Castle Rock Police.' 7'
On June 22, 1999, around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., Mr. Gonzales picked up his
three daughters while they were playing outside Ms. Lenahan's home and
drove away with them in his pickup truck. 17 2 No prior arrangements had
been made for Mr. Gonzales to see his children that evening. 173 Ms.
Lenahan did not know that he had taken her children, though she suspected
as much. She called the Castle Rock Police Station at 7:42 p.m., and
reported that she filed a restraining order against her husband, but that she
did not know "whether he picked them up today or not."174 The station
dispatched two officers to Ms. Lenahan's home, where she showed them a
copy of the restraining order.'75 However, the officers told her that there
was nothing they could do and suggested that she call the police station
again at 10:00 p.m. if the children had not returned home by then.17 1
Ms. Lenahan made four further phone calls to the Castle Rock Police
Station that night. At 8:43 p.m., she informed them that she had located
her daughters: Mr. Gonzales had taken them to Denver-outside the
jurisdiction of the Castle Rock police-without her permission.177  She
called again at 9:57 p.m. to report that the children were still missing, but
she was told to wait until midnight.'7 8 At midnight, she called the police
station a final time and told the dispatcher that her children remained
missing.179
Ms. Lenahan, now desperate to find her children, drove to her husband's
apartment, and when she found it empty, called the police station for a final
170. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 65 (detailing Mr. Gonzales'
abusive behavior to include stalking, exhibitions of suicidal behavior, and breaking and
entering into Ms. Lenahan's home while high on drugs).
171. See id. 67 (reporting that Mr. Gonzales had stalked her, stolen her wedding
rings, and had unlawfully changed the locks on her doors).
172. Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 753.
173. Id.
174. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 72 (noting that they had agreed
to a dinner hour on whatever night was best but no agreement had been made on this
night).
175. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 753 (detailing that Ms. Lenahan requested that
the restraining order be enforced immediately).
176. Id
177. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 1 74 (stating that the behavior
was highly unusual and "wrong," especially since two of the girls had school the next
day).
178. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 753; Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,
75 (relating that she had spoken with Mr. Gonzales who was aware that he was not
supposed to have the children overnight).
179. Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 753.
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time at 12:10 a.m. 80 She was told to wait for an officer to arrive, but when
no one arrived, she went to the police station at 12:50 a.m. and filed a
missing person's report on the children. 81
At 3:25 a.m., Simon Gonzales drove his truck to the Castle Rock Police
Department and fired shots through the station's window with a
semiautomatic handgun he had purchased that evening.182 Mr. Gonzales
exchanged fire with police officers at the station, which resulted in his
death.183 The police found the bodies of three young girls-his daughters
Leslie, Katheryn, and Rebecca Gonzales-inside the cab of his pick-up
truck.184 According to the police investigation, Mr. Gonzales had murdered
all three girls before the shootout with the police. 85
B. Procedural History in U.S. Courts
On January 23, 2001, Jessica Lenahan filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She
alleged that the town of Castle Rock, Colorado, violated her rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution by failing to respond to reports that her estranged husband had
violated the terms of a restraining order.'86 Her complaint further alleged
that the Castle Rock Police Department had an official policy of failing to
respond to violations of restraining orders and that the town tolerated this
lack of enforcement. 87
Despite the Police Department's failure to respond to a mandatory
protective order, the District Court held that Ms. Lenahan failed to state
either a substantive or procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 88  It therefore granted defendant Castle Rock's motion to
180. Id.
181. See id. at 753-54 (noting that Ms. Lenahan filed "an incident report"); Lenahan,
Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 79 (detailing that Ms. Lenahan filed a missing
persons report and that she feared that Mr. Gonzales was suicidal).
182. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 754; Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,
81.
183. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 754; Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,
81.
184. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 754.
185. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, T 82-85 (finding that the girls
were shot at close range and not by any rounds of the police officers, although the exact
location of the homicides of the children was unknown).
186. See id. 86 (presenting both claims of substantive and procedural violations);
Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 751 (alleging that the officers had failed to act pursuant to
official policy or custom).
187. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 754 (alleging that the town's actions
constituted a willful, reckless, and wanton disregard to civil rights).
188. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock (Castle Rock 1), No. Civ.A.00 D 1285,
2001 WL 35973820, at *4-5 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2001) (concluding that the lack of a
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dismiss under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's rejection of Ms. Lenahan's substantive due process claim, but
found that she had a cognizable procedural due process claim. 190 An en
banc panel reached the same conclusion on rehearing, finding that Ms.
Lenahan had a "protected interest in the enforcement of the restraining
order" for which she had a "right to be heard."191 The panel found that the
Castle Rock Police violated this right as they "never 'heard' nor seriously
entertained her request to enforce and protect her interests in the restraining
order." 92 The police, according to the panel, also unconstitutionally denied
Ms. Lenahan a different sort of process: they denied her "bona fide
consideration ... of a request to enforce a restraining order." 9 3
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that Ms. Lenahan
had no constitutionally protected interest in having a restraining order
against her husband enforced by the local police.194 The City of Castle
Rock had not violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as it had not deprived
Ms. Lenahan of property to which she was entitled any procedural
protection under the Due Process Clause. The Court therefore reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.19 5
Justice Scalia, on behalf of seven justices, authored a majority opinion
that hewed narrowly to Fourteenth Amendment precedent. The opinion
stressed that the Due Process Clause does not protect "everything that
might be described as a benefit," but only those benefits to which an
individual has a "legitimate claim of entitlement."'l96 The majority then
explained why Ms. Lenahan did not have such an entitlement under Due
cause of action for such a tragic set of facts was extremely troubling).
189. See id. (holding that Ms. Lenahan did not have a protectable property interest
because the obligation imposed by the protective order was not mandatory).
190. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock (Castle Rock 1), 307 F.3d 1258, 1263,
1266 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Ms. Lenahan could survive the motion to dismiss
because the state statute defined the duties of peace officers and that Ms. Lenahan had
sufficiently pleaded allegations to the degree of a violation of that duty).
191. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock (Castle Rock Il), 366 F.3d 1093, 1110, 1117
(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (finding that Ms. Lenahan justifiably relied on the protective
order).
192. See id at 1117 (expressing that the police never entertained the idea of finding
probable cause to enforce the restraining order).
193. See id. (referring to the police's response to Ms. Lenahan's situation as a
"sham" and "cruel deception").
194. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (concluding that it therefore had
no need to address the town's custom or policy since no property interest existed).
195. See id at 768 (explaining that the benefit a third party may receive from
another being arrested does not trigger Due Process Clause substantive or procedural
protections).
196. See id at 756 (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972)) (noting that there must be more than an "abstract need or desire").
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Process Clause. It relied on two principal justifications.
First, the Court said that benefits that government officials have
discretion to grant or deny do not constitute legitimate entitlements that are
protected by the Due Process Clause.' 97 In this case, Colorado passed a
domestic violence statute that instructed police officers on how to respond
to restraining order violations. These instructions were restated on the back
of the restraining order and required, inter alia, that the police use "every
reasonable means to enforce a restraining order."' 98 The Tenth Circuit,
after examining the text and legislative history in detail, concluded that the
intent of the Colorado legislature was to make enforcement of the orders
mandatory and "alter the fact that the police were not enforcing domestic
abuse restraining orders." 99
The Supreme Court did not adhere to the Tenth Circuit's reading of the
statute, despite the presumption of deference that it usually grants to a
federal court's conclusions as to the law of a state within its jurisdiction. 200
To the contrary, the Court noted that "law enforcement discretion" is
deeply rooted in the United States, and can only be overridden by a clear
statement from the legislature. 20 1 Here, the Colorado statute required the
police to "use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order."202
According to the Court, this language was not sufficiently strong to
eliminate all police discretion.203 This discretion, in the Court's view, leads
to indeterminacy in the enforcement of restraining orders, which "is not the
hallmark of a duty that is mandatory." 2 04 Since only a mandatory duty to
197. See id. (citing Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-
63 (1989)) (stating that a unilateral expectation of a service does not authorize
constitutional protections).
198. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3) (2012) (authorizing a police officer to
arrest a violator of a protective order or, in the alternative, seek a warrant to arrest the
person).
199. See Castle Rock III, 366 F.3d 1093, 1101, 1108 (10th Cir. 2004) (characterizing
police officer response to the enforcement of protective orders as "arbitrary denial of
[the] entitlement").
200. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 757 (acknowledging this presumption of
deference, but refusing to defer to the Tenth Circuit's views because they were not
based "upon a deep well of state-specific expertise, but consisted primarily of quoting
language from the restraining order, the statutory text, and a state-legislative-hearing
transcript.").
201. See id at 761 (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), where the Court
declined to read a law enforcement ordinance as denying police discretion to enforce
the ordinance).
202. See § 18-6-803.5(3) (including assuming all information received from the
registry is true in pursuing probable cause).
203. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 761-63 (explaining that the Colorado domestic
violence statute, other Colorado statutes, and domestic violence statutes in other
jurisdictions still retain at least a modicum of police discretion).
204. See id. at 763 (arguing that a practical necessity for discretion exists, especially
in a case where the violator's whereabouts are unknown).
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enforce would be constitutionally protected, and the police here retained
some discretion in enforcing Ms. Lenahan's restraining order; she did not
have a legitimate "entitlement" to its enforcement under the Due Process
Clause.
A second (and related) reason the Court put forth to explain why Ms.
Lenahan did not have a legitimate entitlement is that the enforcement of her
restraining order-which would include seeking an arrest warrant against
Mr. Gonzales-is itself merely a procedure, not a property interest.20 5 As
Justice Souter explained in his concurring opinion, the sorts of property
interests protected by the Due Process Clause are independent of the
206procedures used to enforce those interests. Justice Souter gave many
examples of protected property interests, including welfare benefits, utility
services, and professional licenses, which were "distinguishable from the
procedural obligations imposed on the state officials to protect [the
property interests]." 2 0 7 In this case, however, Ms. Lenahan's claim would
take the Court beyond any previously recognized property interest "by
collapsing the distinction between property protected and the process that
protects it."208 The majority agreed with this view, but went even further to
conclude that Ms. Lenahan's claim to an entitlement of a procedure not
only failed to specify a property interest, but was inadequate even to
support standing.209
For these reasons, the Court held that Colorado had not created a
210legitimate entitlement that was protected by the Due Process Clause.
The Court went on to state that even if Colorado had created such an
entitlement, it would still not necessarily constitute a property interest for
the purposes of the Due Process Clause.2 11
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a dissenting opinion
that disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Colorado statute.
205. See id. (holding that the procedure is inadequate even as to standing, let alone a
property interest).
206. See id. at 771-72 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that state rules of
executive procedure cannot confer property rights to be protected by the Due Process
Clause).
207. See id. at 772 (holding that the property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause always exists apart from state procedural protection).
208. See id. (contending that an extension of protected property interests to Ms.
Lenahan would result in the federalization of mandatory state law directives).
209. See id. at 764 (majority opinion) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992)) (noting that Ms. Lenahan would have been assured nothing more than
the seeking of a warrant).
210. See id. at 766 (commenting that the enforcement of restraining orders are vague
and novel and cannot just "go without saying").
211. See id. at 766-68 (purporting that a right to the entitlement of a restraining
order does not resemble any traditional conception of property and has no ascertainable
monetary value).
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Justice Stevens found that "Colorado law has quite clearly eliminated the
police's discretion to deny enforcement" and Ms. Lenahan therefore had a
legitimate claim of entitlement to enforcement.2 12 With this established,
Justice Stevens went on to conclude that state officials could not deprive
213Ms. Lenahan of this protected interest without following fair procedures.
On this view, the Castle Rock police were obligated, at a minimum, to
"listen to the claimant and then apply the relevant criteria" in reaching
their decision.2 14 The Police Department's failure to follow even these
basic safeguards resulted in "an unacceptable risk of arbitrary and
'erroneous deprivation[s]' [of citizens' private interests]."215
C. The Inter-American Commission Report
In July 2011, six years after the Supreme Court's ruling, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights published a landmark report in
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, in which it concluded that
the United States violated several rights protected by the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration).216
These rights include: Jessica Lenahan's right to equality and non-
discrimination under Article II; her daughters' right to life under Article 1,
in conjunction with their right to special protection as female children
under Article VII; and Ms. Lenahan and her next-of-kin's right to judicial
protection under Article XVIII. 217
For the purposes of this Article, we will focus on the Commission's
findings with respect to Ms. Lenahan's right to equality and non-
discrimination. Article II of the American Declaration states that "[a]ll
persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established
in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or
any other factor." 2 18 According to the Commission, the right to equality
212. See id. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Ms. Lenahan was entitled
to far more than a "unilateral expectation" of enforcement).
213. See id. at 792 (contending that the police's conduct clearly amounted to a due
process violation).
214. See id. (noting that the State must listen to what that person has to say to
prevent mistaken deprivations of property).
215. See id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (holding that
the failure to adhere to these minimal safeguards violated Ms. Lenahan's constitutional
rights).
216. See Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, 5 (2011) (concluding that the state failed to act with due diligence).
217. See id. (finding that the United States violated Articles XXIV and IV of the
American Declaration, but concluding that the claims related to these articles were
adequately addressed under Article XVIII).
218. Organization of American States Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser.L/V/.4 Rev. 9
(2003).
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requires states not only to provide for equal protection of the law, but also
to "adopt the measures necessary to recognize and guarantee the effective
equality of all persons before the law."21 9 Since gender-based violence is
"one of the most extreme and pervasive forms of discrimination" that
severely impairs and nullifies the enforcement of women's rights, states
must take "positive action" to protect women from this sort of violence,
which includes domestic violence.220
The Commission noted that states have been held liable under
international law for failing to take measures to protect women from
gender-based violence. 2 2 1 In the domestic violence context, the
Commission observed that Article II requires states to prevent and
eradicate both direct and indirect violence against women, including
"domestic violence perpetrated by private actors in certain
circumstances." 22 2
According to the Commission, a state's human rights obligations in this
regard can be understood through the international legal principle of due
diligence.223 This principle sets forth the circumstances under which a state
must prevent and respond to the acts or omissions of private actors. It
encompasses "the organization of the entire state structure-including the
State's legislative framework, public policies, law enforcement machinery
and judicial system."2 2 4
In this case, the Commission concluded that the state apparatus "was not
duly organized, coordinated and ready to protect these victims from
domestic violence by adequately and effectively implanting the restraining
order," which resulted in a violation of Article II of the American
Declaration.22 5 The Commission noted that this violation was exacerbated
by a "historical problem with the enforcement of protection orders" that
disproportionately affects women, particularly women from minority and
low-income groups.226
219. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, T 108-09 (establishing that states
must adopt measures necessary to recognize and guarantee effective equality and
abstain from discriminatory framework).
220. See id TT 110-12, 117 (considering state failures in the realm of domestic
violence to be affronts to the right to life of women).
221. See id. 112 (noting that every key international human rights instrument
incorporates the right to life).
222. See id. 120 (stating that the eradication of domestic violence is a crucial
component of the State's duty to eliminate all forms of discrimination).
223. See id. T 125 (using due diligence as a tool to understand the obligations in
practice to victims of domestic violence).
224. See id (stating that both the Commission and the Supreme Court of the United
States accept the due diligence principle).
225. Id. T 160.
226. See id. T 161 (noting that within this context, a high correlation between wife
battering and child abuse exists).
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The Commission's Report highlighted problems with the Castle Rock
Police Department's handling of the case. It found that the Police
Department did not respond appropriately to Ms. Lenahan's requests.
Despite her numerous phone calls and trip to the police station, the police
made no serious effort to locate her daughters or to enforce the restraining
orders. For example, when Ms. Lenahan called the police station at
approximately 10:00 p.m. to report that she knew the children were with
their father, the dispatcher responded dismissively that she was being "a
,,227little ridiculous making us freak out and thinking the kids are gone. As
the Report concluded, though Ms. Lenahan consistently conveyed her
concerns regarding the whereabouts of her children, "the dispatchers and
officers apparently applied only their personal perceptions in determining
that the girls were safe because they were with their father." 228
The Report notes further that the police officers failed to conduct a
"thorough check of Simon Gonzales' previous criminal background,"
which would have alerted them to his erratic and abusive behavior that Ms.
Lenahan had reported earlier.2 29 The Police Department also did not appear
to have any "protocols or directives in place guiding police officers on how
to respond" to reported restraining order violations, which led to delays in
their response.2 30 Most glaringly, Castle Rock Police officers did not seem
to understand that it was their responsibility-and not Ms. Lenahan's-to
determine whether the restraining order had been violated.2 3 1 As this was a
domestic violence situation, Ms. Lenahan (and her children) might have
been in danger if she confronted Mr. Gonzales and demanded the
children's return. Thus, instead of asking Ms. Lenahan to locate her
children and then call them back (which they requested on at least two
occasions), the police should have tried to locate Mr. Gonzales and the
children themselves.2 32
The Report also criticized the investigation into the deaths of Ms.
Lenahan's daughters. While the investigation concluded that all three girls
227. See id. 76 (showing that the dispatcher also expressed frustration over the
lack of arrangements made between Ms. Lenahan and Mr. Gonzales).
228. See id 152 (concluding that the police were clearly acting on their own biases
and did not follow through once they discovered the restraining order allowed for
parenting time).
229. See id. 154 (contending that understanding his behavior would have in turn
led to a better understanding of the risks of a violation of the order).
230. See id. 155 (detailing that it took the dispatcher over an hour to enter an
attempt to locate Mr. Gonzales and his vehicle).
231. See id. 158 (exemplifying the lack of understanding by having Ms. Lenahan
repeatedly contact Mr. Gonzales in spite of the police's knowledge that it was a
domestic violence situation).
232. See id. 158 (demonstrating that the State itself used the defense that Ms.
Lenahan never reported that the restraining order had been violated).
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died due to injuries caused by "large caliber gunshot," the autopsy reports
did not identify which bullets, those of the police or Mr. Gonzales, actually
struck Leslie, Katheryn, and Rebecca Gonzales.233 As a result, the
Commission recommended that a "serious, impartial and exhaustive
investigation" be conducted to ascertain the exact cause, time, and place of
the three deaths.234
In its recommendations, the Report also urged the U.S. government to
conduct a thorough investigation into the "systematic failures that took
place related to the enforcement of Jessica Lenahan's protection order" and
to conduct an inquiry "to determine the responsibilities of public officials
for violating state and/or federal laws, and holding those responsible
accountable."235 It further recommended that the United States pass
"multifaceted legislation" to improve the enforcement of mandatory
protective orders and pay Ms. Lenahan and her family "full reparations."236
D. Differences Between the U.S. Supreme Court and Inter-American
Commission Decisions
While both the Inter-American Commission and the U.S. Supreme Court
relied on comparable facts to rule on Jessica Lenahan's case, they reached
completely different conclusions. At least two factors account for this
divergence: (1) sources of law and (2) the breadth of inquiry undertaken by
each body.
The Commission relied on a wider array of legal sources than the
Supreme Court, and it conducted a much broader inquiry into the issue of
domestic violence both in the United States and abroad. Justice Scalia,
who wrote the majority opinion for the Court, is strongly against referring
to international or foreign law sources when interpreting individual rights
under the Constitution. 237 As a result, his opinion cited only U.S. sources,
and confined itself to a narrow question-whether Ms. Lenahan had stated
a cognizable claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.23 8 Interestingly, though the Fourteenth Amendment also
233. See id. 85 (noting solely the entry areas of the bullet wounds).
234. See id. 201(1) (requiring that the next-of-kin be notified of the course of the
investigation).
235. See id. 201(2) (necessitating the need for an investigation to prevent and
guarantee that such situations would not reoccur).
236. See id. 201(3)-(4) (recommending that the legislation be accompanied by
adequate resources so that it could be effectively implemented).
237. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("I do not believe that approval by 'other nations and peoples' should buttress our
commitment to American principles any more than (what should logically follow)
disapproval by 'other nations and peoples' should weaken that commitment.").
238. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. 748, 751, 755 (2005) (restricting the analysis to a
violation stemming from the failure of the police officers to respond pursuant to official
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guarantees "equal protection of the laws," the Equal Protection Clause was
conspicuously absent in the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis. This is
because the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the "equality"
guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution to not require the government to
protect marginalized or vulnerable groups (including women) from private
acts of violence and discrimination.239
By contrast, the Inter-American Commission based its report on the
American Declaration, which imposes a broad definition of "equality" on
member states, including positive obligations to adopt legislation and other
measures to protect vulnerable groups from both public and private acts of
violence.2 40 To interpret the content of state obligations under the
Declaration, the Commission relied on principles of public international
law and drew support from a wide range of sources, including international
conventions, U.N. resolutions, U.N. reports, and the decisions of other
international and regional bodies. 241
The Commission also conducted its own investigation into the Lenahan
case and the issue of domestic violence generally. This brought to light
facts that the U.S. Supreme Court did not even consider. First, the
Commission examined the incidence of domestic violence in the United
States 242 It found that there were at least 3.5 million incidents over a four-
year period, and that certain women-particularly Native American women
and women from low-income groups-were especially at risk.243 Second,
the Commission looked into the problem of domestic violence in Colorado
policy or custom).
239. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620-21 (2000) ("[T]he language
and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment place certain limitations on the manner in
which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. . . . Foremost among these
limitations is the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very
terms, prohibits only state action."); see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638
(1883) (holding that the Constitution places restraint upon state action); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
authorize Congress to create a code to regulate private rights); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 542-43 (1876) (positing that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not add to the rights of one citizen against another).
240. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 123 (basing its findings on the
growing and broad international consensus to use due diligence to interpret State legal
obligations).
241. See, e.g., id. 1 124 (citing United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and a
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women to establish the broad
international consensus on the use of the due diligence principle to interpret state
obligations towards violence against women); id. 132 (referring to decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights and the CEDAW Committee where states were held
responsible for failing to protect domestic violence victims).
242. See id. NT 93-94 (characterizing the problem of domestic violence as acute and
significant).
243. See id. (demonstrating that only half of the domestic violence in the United
States is reported to the police).
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specifically. It found that the state experienced "alarming rates of domestic
violence," given that over a three-year period "45 percent of female
homicide victims statewide were killed by an intimate partner."244 Finally,
the Commission looked at both federal and state laws in the United States
that targeted domestic violence to determine if they provided adequate
protection. The Commission's Report traced the development of the
restraining order as a state law remedy for domestic violence, and the
enactment of the federal Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA).245
By gathering this data on the incidence of domestic violence, and by
analyzing the legal framework created to combat it, the Commission was
able to place this case in its broader sociopolitical context. It looked
beyond the facts of Ms. Lenahan's legal claim to conclude that domestic
violence remained a serious problem, especially for minority women, in
both the State of Colorado and the United States generally. On this basis,
the Commission recommended not only reparations for Ms. Lenahan, but
legislation at both the federal and state levels to protect women and
children from domestic violence, accompanied by "adequate resources to
foster their implementation" and "training programs for law enforcement
and justice system officials."246
However, the extent to which U.S. federal or state governments will
actually follow these recommendations is unclear. Since the Commission's
conclusions are not legally binding-and the U.S. Supreme Court did not
find any constitutional violations in this case-the United States is not
compelled to adopt measures that would meet its obligations under the
American Declaration.
Moreover, the United States is not a party to CEDAW, which has a
number of provisions that relate to domestic violence.24 7 These include
Article 2 (comprehensive state obligation to prohibit and eliminate
discrimination against women), Article 5 (elimination of prejudices and
practices based upon the stereotyped roles of women and men), and Article
16 (elimination of discrimination against women in marriage and family
relations).2 48 President Jimmy Carter signed the treaty in 1980, but the
244. See id. 1 99 (noting that most of the homicides in Colorado are
disproportionately and alarmingly female).
245. See id. 97-98 (describing VAWA as a comprehensive legislative packet that
requires states to enforce protective orders, although many of the responsible parties
are state and local laws and ordinances).
246. See id. T 201(4)-(5) (calling for designs of model protocols to be followed
across the country).
247. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women arts. 2, 5, 16, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (providing, inter alia, to pursue
policies to eliminate discrimination and promote the principles of equality for women).
248. See id. (establishing several protections, including adopting appropriate
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Senate has never ratified it.2 49 As with many multilateral human rights
treaties, the Senate is likely concerned that CEDAW would conflict with
U.S. laws or dictate to federal and state governments how to tackle
domestic violence.
India, by contrast, signed the Convention in 1980 and ratified it in
1993 .250 This might account for the Indian government's greater
willingness to pass positive legislation to combat domestic violence.
V. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF THE LENAHAN APPROACH IN INDIA
In the spirit of Lenahan, the Indian Government has taken positive
measures to combat domestic violence through legislation enacted in 2005.
Domestic violence has been criminalized in India since 1983, when Section
498A to the Indian Penal Code was adopted. Section 498A allows women
to file criminal complaints against their husbands and husbands' relatives
for the crime of "cruelty." 25 1 As discussed earlier, complaints filed under
Section 498A are compoundable and non-bailable, which means that once
filed they cannot be withdrawn and the accused must appear before a judge
to receive bail.252
Section 498A has proved a limited remedy for domestic violence. It
only addresses domestic violence faced by married women. Since it is
located within the Indian Penal Code, it offers no civil remedies. Thus,
prior to 2005, married Indian women could not obtain restraining orders
against their husbands unless they filed suit for matrimonial remedies like
divorce or judicial separation.2 53 Such limitations, allied with a powerful
social movement, led the Indian Parliament to enact the PWDVA.
In 2005, the Parliament passed the PWDVA, a wide-ranging law that
protects women from various types of violence (physical, sexual, verbal,
and economic). Unlike Section 498A, which institutes only criminal
sanctions against perpetrators of domestic violence, the PWDVA includes
legislative measures and sanctions to destroy discrimination against women).
249. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, States Parties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Aug. 31, 2012, 1:09
PM), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-
8&chapter-4&lang-en (demonstrating that President Carter signed on July 17, 1980).
250. See id (showing that India signed the Convention on July 30, 1980, only days
after the United States).
251. See INDIA PEN. CODE § 498A (1860) ("Whoever, being the husband or the
relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable
to fine."); HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 34, at 146.
252. See CODE CRIM. PROC. (India): Offenses Relating to Marriage (noting also that
the Magistrate of the first class tries such claims).
253. See Jayna Kothari, Criminal Law on Domestic Violence, Promises and Limits,
EcoN. & POL. WKLY. 4843, 4848 (Nov. 12, 2005) (noting that even where injunction
orders were available, violations of the orders came with no penalties).
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both civil and criminal penalties. Victims can seek injunctions and
protective orders whose breach can result in criminal punishments such as
imprisonment and fines. 254
The PWDVA also expands the ambit of domestic violence protection to
unmarried women. It covers all relationships based on consanguinity,
marriage, adoption, and even relationships that are "in the nature of
marriage."255 Moreover, echoing the Inter-American Commissions'
recommendations, the PWDVA imposes positive obligations on the state to
protect women from violence, including mandatory police sensitization and
awareness training on issues of domestic violence.256 It also requires state
governments to appoint protection officers and service providers to assist
victims in obtaining shelter and medical assistance, and in filing domestic
incident reports to the local magistrate.257
Thus, at first glance, both Section 498A and particularly the PWDVA are
very progressive pieces of legislation that comport with India's obligations
under international human rights law to prevent and prosecute acts of
domestic violence. However, as we discussed in Sections II and III, these
laws have not been successful. This failure can be attributed to two major
negative consequences: (1) the victimization of male partners and their
female relatives; and (2) police harassment and rent-seeking. While the
first is mostly a consequence of poor drafting, the second reveals a deeply
rooted institutional problem that is more difficult to resolve.
A. Victimization
The creation of a new class of victims is an unintentional and
unfortunate consequence of domestic violence laws in India. Troublingly,
when these laws are misused it is not just male partners, but also their
female relatives who bear the consequences. Neither the PWDVA nor
Section 498A has any safeguards to protect these (often female) victims of
false complaints. This can be easily remedied. Under existing Indian law,
Section 340 of Criminal Procedure Code, read in conjunction with Section
191-193 of the Indian Penal Code, provides for the filing of complaints
against individuals who present false evidence in Court. It is imperative to
have a similar mechanism built into the PWDVA and Section 498A to
254. See LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at xiii (seeing domestic
violence as a civil and criminal issue); see also HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
supra note 34, at xix (highlighting availability of civil remedies).
255. See LAWYER'S COLLECTIVE REPORT, supra note 28, at xiii (expanding the class
of protected women).
256. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005,
§ 11, INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (imposing obligations on all state actors).
257. See id. §§ 8-10 (separating the duties of protection and service officers into
assistance and legal).
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provide some sort of deterrence for false complaints, while still ensuring
that genuine complaints of domestic violence are filed without any adverse
impacts.
Section 498A has become a lightning-rod of controversy and has spurred
conservative activism because it does not allow men to bring domestic
violence cases. For instance, conservative opponents of this provision have
created 498a.org, a website that describes itself as "an attempt to create
awareness among Indian nationals about the rampant misuse of 498a
(Dowry Law misuse) by unscrupulous women to extort money and harass
their husband's entire extended family . .. [it] is dedicated to the victims of
gender-biased laws of India. . . ."258
The PWDVA also appears to only allow women to bring complaints of
domestic violence.2 5 9 It also includes "insults" and "ridicule" under the
definition of "verbal and emotional abuse," without defining those terms. 260
Further, Sections 18 and 23 of the Act empower magistrates, on a prima
facie showing that "domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take
place," to issue ex parte orders that prohibit accused perpetrators from
entering their homes.26 1 Other problematic provisions include Sections 19
and 20(1).262
Gender-specific and vague provisions like these exacerbate the potential
for false complaints. However, there has been no serious effort to measure
the extent of this problem. The Malimath Committee Report, which is the
best-known study in this area, concluded that Section 498A is grossly
misused without offering any statistics to support this finding. 263 The
Report instead likely relied on rumor and general public impressions,
which have been shaped by websites like 498a.org that almost certainly
exaggerate the incidence of false complaints. Moreover, local authorities
label many domestic violence cases "false" in situations where the victim
258. See 498A.ORG, http://www.498a.org/index.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012)
(referring to men as the victims of gender-biased laws in India).
259. See Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade, (2011) 3 S.CC.
650, 8-9 (India) (ruling that the term "respondent" includes the female relatives of
accused men, but not explicitly extending it to women in domestic relationships);
Aruna Pramod Shah v. Union of India, (2008) 102 D.R.J. 543, 543 (Delhi H.C.) (Apr.
7, 2008) (India) (rejecting a challenge to the Act's constitutionality made on the
grounds that it defines the term "respondent" as only applying to men).
260. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, §
3, Explanation I(iii), INDIA CODE (2005), vol. 12 (specifying insults only to the point
that insults regarding the lack of a child or male child as especially insulting).
261. See id. §§ 18-19, 23 (granting large discretionary power to the Magistrate in
implementing protective orders).
262. See supra Part II (discussing the problems of false claims and their effects on
men and their relatives).
263. See AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 145, § IV(1) (noting the difficulties in
substantiating claims based on rumors or independent studies with political leanings).
374
42
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss2/4
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION IN INDIA
reached a compromise with the perpetrator, witnesses turned hostile, or the
264petitioner chose to withdraw her complaint for other reasons.
Due to the uncertainty behind reports of false complaints, we have no
good data on false complaints and their incidence is likely exaggerated.
What is clear, however, is that conservative groups have capitalized on the
poor drafting of domestic violence laws to exaggerate the extent of false
complaints and harassment. Public sentiment towards Section 498A and
the PWDVA might well be improved by improving the drafting of these
laws to make them gender-neutral, to define offenses more clearly, and to
perhaps make it more difficult for women to obtain prospective ex parte
relief.
B. Police Harassment and Rent-Seeking
The failure of police officers to effectively investigate and report
domestic violence (and possible dowry-related deaths) is widely
acknowledged. 265 This is due to both a cultural unwillingness to investigate
or report domestic violence incidents and rampant corruption within the
Indian police forces.
The police's unwillingness to investigate and report this crime is rooted
in strong cultural beliefs that regard domestic violence as a family matter
outside the purview of the state.266 More fundamentally, many Indians-
and therefore many Indian police officers-do not consider domestic
violence to be an unacceptable form of control over women.267 The notion
that a woman is a man's property-and therefore not entitled to assert any
268rights against a man-is also prevalent.
Cultural reasons also account for the underreporting of domestic
violence cases. Some women may feel embarrassed, deny that there is a
264. See id. (describing that such cases amount to forty percent of final reports
stemming from section 498A complaints).
265. See, e.g., Kirti Singh, Violence Against Women and the Indian Law, in
VIOLENCE, LAW & WOMEN'S RIGHTS 77, 96 (Savitri Gooneskere ed., 2004) (reporting
that the police often refuse to give a copy of the First Information Report to the
complainant even when bound by law); Judith G. Greenberg, Criminalizing Dowry
Deaths: The Indian Experience, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 801, 813 (2003)(describing the hostility and sexual violence toward women by the police).
266. See AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 145, § IV(1) (urging that domestic
violence be thought of as a criminal rather than a familial matter).
267. See Puma Manchandia, Practical Steps Toward Eliminating Dowry and Bride-
Burning in India, 13 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 319 (2005) (reinforcing that Indian
society has a strong predilection towards regarding women as their husband's
property).
268. See Pardee, supra note 11, at 502 (reasoning that because a man feels his wife
is his property, he may dictate her fate and therefore reasonably engage in violent
activities such as dowry death).
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problem, or fail to recognize that the perpetrator's behavior is abusive.269
Alarmingly, seventy percent of female domestic violence victims in India
believe their physical abuse was justified, which makes them unlikely to
report incidents.27 0
In addition to cultural obstacles, widespread corruption limits effective
police enforcement of domestic violence complaints. The police are often
reluctant to press charges against, or investigate individuals belonging to,
the political or economic elite.271 There have been several news articles
since 2005 that point toward police inaction in many Indian states. For
instance, Zeenath, a widow, filed a complaint against her in-laws for
domestic violence in the local court of Chandigarh, Punjab, as the police
272
refused to register her complaint. In a recent rape incident in Orissa, the
police similarly refused to register a complaint against the accused.2 73 An
even more shocking news article revealed that a female police officer
experienced domestic violence for eight years at the hands of her husband
while her police colleagues and the local government in Indore, Madhya
Pradesh refused to intervene.274
The Lenahan case highlights a similar problem in the United States.
Jessica Lenahan called the police on several occasions, but they refused to
intervene and failed to prevent the deaths of her daughters. 2 75 Like India,
the United States has historically viewed domestic violence as a private
matter unsuited for law enforcement or judicial intervention.276 The Inter-
269. See INT'L CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN MUST
STOP: TOWARD ACHIEVING THE THIRD MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL TO PROMOTE
GENDER EQUALITY & EMPOWER WOMEN 1 (2005), available at
http://www.icrw.org/docs/2005_brief mdg-violence.pdf (reporting that violence from
both intimate partners and strangers goes widely unreported).
270. See Vyas, supra note 11, at 187 (signaling that the patriarchal notions in Indian
society are pervasive).
271. See Ghosh & Choudhuri, supra note 19, at 327 (highlighting that political clout
may save a man accused of domestic violence from punishment).
272. See Raghav Ohri, Manimajra Resident Accuses Chandigarh Police ofInaction,
INDIAN EXPRESS (Nov. 25, 2010), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/manimajra-
resident-accuses-chandigarh-police/715666/ (reporting that police officials stated that
they were not aware of the woman's complaint and needed to check on it).
273. See Debabrata Mohanty, Orissa Rape: NCW Report Points at Police Inaction,
INDIAN EXPRESS (Feb. 19, 2012), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/orissa-rape-ncw-
report-points-at-police-ina/913941/ (detailing a situation in which police failed to
investigate the gang rape of a girl that resulted in a coma).
274. See Domestic Violence: Cop Faces Police Inaction, DAILYBHASKAR.COM (Feb.
6, 2011), http://daily.bhaskar.com/article/MP-IND-domestic-violence-cop-faces-police-
inaction-1821836.html (noting that even a police inspector could not receive help from
the police regarding her domestic abuse).
275. See Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, 160 (2011) (concluding that the United States failed in its duty to protect
victims in the Lenahan case from domestic violence).
276. See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2,11 (2006)
(positing that wife beating was historically seen as an appropriate way to chastise and
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American Commission therefore recommended that the United States
"continue adopting public policies and institutional programs aimed at
restructuring the stereotypes of domestic violence victims, and to promote
the eradication of discriminatory socio-cultural patterns."27 7
In India, too, domestic violence can only be effectively tackled if it is
conceived of as part of a broader series of reforms to the political and legal
culture. To echo Lenahan, "multifaceted legislation" must be adopted.2 78
While the existing laws can be amended to be gender-neutral and less
ambiguous, deeply engrained cultural beliefs and corruption cannot be
altered so easily. Laws targeted at domestic violence, like Section 498A
and the PWDVA, will only be effective if the Indian Government takes
affirmative steps to remedy the underlying social issues.
To that end, we offer a few preliminary suggestions. First, it is essential
that the Government collect accurate data pertaining to the misuse of
current domestic violence laws. This data collection should encompass a
range of issues, including: false complaints, police failures to investigate,
and extortion by both the police and complainants. Given that domestic
violence victims often do not report incidents, trained professionals,
including female survivors of domestic violence, should be tasked with
collecting this information. If such data is collected, it will not only permit
the government to design more effective legislation to combat domestic
violence, but might well deflate the momentum that conservative groups
have gathered in rallying against existing legislation. For if the improved
data collection shows that actual incidence of false complaints is low,
groups that continue to cast male respondents and female in-laws as the
real "victims" in this context would find their credibility strained.
Second, the Government should institute disciplinary sanctions against
state officials-including police officers and judges-who fail to properly
investigate or adjudicate domestic violence claims, accept bribes to alter
the outcome of a case or investigation, or use the threat of a domestic
violence claim to extort money from men. While the high degree of
corruption in the system will likely make these sanctions difficult to
enforce, the mere threat of public censure should induce officials in the
criminal justice system to more effectively enforce domestic violence laws.
Finally, channeling Lenahan, we propose that the Indian state adopt
"public policies and institutional programs aimed at restructuring the
discipline wives); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT: ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 3 (1984) (acknowledging that spousal
or child abuse is still widely, if decreasingly, viewed as a private family matter).
277. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, T 201(6) (reaching such
measures through comprehensive prevention programs).
278. See id. 201(4) (including precautionary measures to protect women from
imminent violence).
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stereotypes of domestic violence victims" and "promote the eradication of
discriminatory socio-cultural patterns that impede women" from equal
protection under the law.2 79 This requires educational programs targeted
not only at law enforcement officials, but also at the general public, and
particularly children. It is only when the Indian public recognizes domestic
violence (and the under-enforcement of laws meant to stop it) as a serious
threat to women's rights (and human rights) that domestic violence can be
eradicated.
279. See id 1201(6) (advocating also for the full protection of children).
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